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Towards a Radical Digital Citizenship in Digital Education 
 
Akwugo Emejulu, University of Edinburgh 
Callum McGregor, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract 
In this article we attempt to define and explore a concept of ‘radical digital 
citizenship’ and its implications for digital education. We argue that the ‘digital’ 
and its attendant technologies are constituted by on-going materialist struggles 
for equality and justice in the Global South and North which are erased in the 
dominant literature and debates in digital education. We assert the need for 
politically informed understandings of the digital, technology and citizenship and 
for a ‘radical digital citizenship’ in which critical social relations with technology 
are made visible and emancipatory technological practices for social justice are 
developed.  
 
Key words: digital activism; digital capitalism; digital citizenship; digital 
education; digital labour; digital literacy; digital materialism; social justice; social 
movements; Black Lives Matter 
 
Introduction 
The reason the digital debate feels so empty and toothless is simple: [it 
is] framed as a debate over “the digital” rather than “the political” and 
“the economic”. (Morozov, 2013) 
 
In this article we attempt to define and explore a concept of radical digital 
citizenship and its implications for both digital education and digital citizenship. 
By ‘digital education’ we mean the processes of teaching and learning about 
digital technology and the use of digital technology in educational spaces (Bayne 
and Ross, 2011; Goodfellow, 2011; Selwyn, 2011). In particular, we seek to 
examine how hegemonic constructions of digital citizenship within the field of 
digital education do little to critically understand citizens’ social relations with 
technology and the ‘digital’ and, in fact, obscure and silence the particular 
politics embedded within digital citizenship. In order to counter problematic 
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constructions of digital citizenship, we argue there is need for a radical digital 
citizenship. By radical digital citizenship we mean praxis through which 
individuals and groups: (1) critically analyse the social, political, economic and 
environmental consequences of technologies in everyday life; (2) collectively 
deliberate and take action to build alternative and emancipatory technologies 
and technological practices.  
 
Our interpretation of radical digital citizenship seeks to displace instrumental 
conceptions of digital literacy, which reduce digital citizenship to mere skills 
acquisition for navigating a digital world. Although there are good examples of 
critical scholarship engaging with this issue (e.g. Collin and Apple, 2010; 
Goodlaw and Lea, 2013; Knox and Bayne, 2013), a developed sense of the 
political—and how it shapes social and cultural relations—remains largely 
absent in the field of digital education. We argue that radical digital citizenship 
should problematise dominant ideas about technologies and rethink citizens’ 
relations with technology to advance the common good.  Radical digital 
citizenship should also debunk magical thinking whereby the ‘digital’ is invoked 
as a fetish, operating to obscure the material inequalities and socially 
exploitative relations upon which the proliferation of digital technology is 
premised.  
 
These (political and educational) tasks of ‘seeing the world relationally’ and 
‘repositioning’ ourselves accordingly, are fundamental to understanding the 
connections between global crises, education and social justice (Apple, 2010, p. 
189). Moreover, they require a more critical and capacious understanding of 
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digital literacy than mainstream definitions allow (Collin and Apple, 2010). By 
‘critical’ we mean recognition of the ways in which the dominant discursive and 
material practices of digital literacy are entangled in a wider web of exploitation. 
By ‘capacious’ we mean understanding the agential capacity of students, 
educators and activists who ‘appropriate the tools of high-tech global capitalism 
for use in the construction of more just orders’ (Collin and Apple, 2010, p. 46).  
 
We begin this article with a discussion of the obscured politics of digital 
citizenship in the field of digital education. We then move on to explore the 
materiality of the digital and the consequences this has for the politics of digital 
citizenship. This leads us to a discussion of how the politics of recognition and 
redistribution are interwoven with processes of digital subjectification. We 
conclude with an examination of how a radical digital citizenship might support 
the development of a radical digital education. 
 
The depoliticisation of digital citizenship and technology 
In both formal and informal educational contexts, digital citizenship is primarily 
framed as the ability to effectively make sense of, navigate and exist in the digital 
world (Hargittai, 2002; 2007; Seale and Dutton, 2012). From learning how to 
access and use digital technologies, to developing ‘netiquette’ in online 
interactions, to understanding the ramifications of one’s digital footprint, privacy 
and rights, digital citizenship appears to be synonymous with digital literacy 
(Knox and Bayne, 2013). By digital literacy we mean ‘the capabilities which fit 
someone for living, learning and working in a digital society’ (JISC 22/9/15). 
Digital citizenship is also increasingly articulated through rights-based 
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discourses, focusing on debates around access to relevant digital technologies 
and resilience in the face of a rapidly changing world whereby education, work 
and leisure are ‘disrupted’ by new technologies (Potter, 2006; Jounell, 2007; 
Barber, Donnelly and Rizvi, 2013; Oyedemi, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, in much of the digital education literature, technology—digital or 
otherwise—is assumed to possess neutral properties that can simply be 
harnessed to achieve educators’ aims. Consequently, digital technology is 
excepted from debates about inequality and injustice and not implicated in their 
reproductions (for example see: Boody, 2001; Gane, 2005; notable exceptions to 
this are Selwyn, 2008; Knox and Bayne, 2013; Sheail, 2014; the 2015 special 
issue of Learning, Media and Technology 40(3), focused on critical approaches to 
open digital education).  
 
In this context, digital citizenship functions as a reaction to technologies 
operating as disciplining devices compelling individuals and groups to adopt 
particular skills and ways of being in order to successfully exist in this newly and 
constantly disrupted world of work and leisure. To be sure, constructing digital 
citizenship as a lived practice and a social learning process, rather than a 
conferred status, is important (Lister, 2003; Isin and Neilsen, 2008). However, 
thinking about digital citizenship only in the context of technological change 
renders digital citizenship as an unproblematic and instrumental process of 
becoming an ‘effective’ citizen able to cope in a fast changing and disrupted new 
world of work and leisure. Constructing technology as innocent or neutral 
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misunderstands the social relations of technology and its very real material 
consequences in our social world.  
What is interesting in these dominant conceptions of digital citizenship is that 
they seem to have been constructed in isolation from collective struggles for 
social, political, economic and civil rights and their corresponding notions of 
citizenship (Marshall, 1950; Berlin, 1958; Young 1990; Lister 2003; Yuval-Davis, 
2013). Thus, fetishised notions of digital citizenship have been stripped of their 
politics and political implications. By focusing on ‘what’s new’, oftentimes the 
field of digital education has failed to ask ‘who has power’. This is fundamentally 
problematic because, as Neil Selwyn (2012, p. 217) argues, ‘many of the issues 
that surround education and technology are fundamentally political questions 
that are always asked of education and society – i.e. questions of what education 
is, and questions of what education should be.’ 
 
In arguing for a radical digital citizenship, we seek to explicitly inject politics into 
constructions of citizenship and technology in digital education. We seek to 
frame digital citizenship in wider discursive and material struggles for equality 
and social justice. In so doing, we wish to make the ‘digital’ a key site for 
articulating, organising and mobilising citizens for rights. We do not conceive of 
digital citizenship as separate from Marshallian, feminist and intersectional 
notions of citizenship but instead see it as a new context in which perennial 
debates about the redistribution of income and wealth, the recognition of 
difference and the representation and participation of different kinds of citizens 
are played out in the public sphere (Marshall, 1950; Young, 1990; Lister, 2003; 
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Fraser, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2013). In this way, digital citizenship becomes 
another front in citizens’ struggles for justice. 
 
We will now turn to discuss the materialities, and hence, the politics, of the 
digital by exploring how ‘new’ technologies reproduce familiar struggles for 
justice. We will also explore the new opportunities this site of struggle offer 
citizens and the implications this has for our conceptions of radical digital 
citizenship and its technologies.  
 
What’s old and what’s new in the materialities of digital citizenship? 
In attempting to subvert the fetishisation of the ‘new’ in digital citizenship, we 
must first explore the ‘old’ materiality of the digital—the natural resources that 
make the digital possible, their relationship to global social relations of 
production and the political and environmental consequences of these relations. 
To paraphrase Paulo Freire (1970), this ‘reading of the world’, in the context of 
digital technology, should be a key component of a radical digital citizenship. As 
Parikka (2015) has demonstrated in his recent work, A Geology of Media, the 
digital ‘demands its ecology.’ We argue that making this ecology clear, in turn 
clarifies the ideological function of tropes such as the ‘information age’, ‘network 
society’, ‘immaterial labour’ and the ‘participatory web 2.0’ that are often used 
legitimise the supposed emancipatory potential of digital technologies (Ampuja 
& Koivisto, 2014; Fuchs, 2012). We will now turn to examine the ‘old’ oppressive 
relations that make ‘new’ digital technologies possible—the exploitation of 
natural resources and labour in the Global South. 
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Digital technology’s everyday violence of resource extraction and labour 
exploitation 
Columbo-tantalite, or coltan, is a ‘black metallic grit’ that is obtained by ‘panning’ 
from alluvial or riverine deposits typically in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) (Whitman, 2012). From this exported grit, the element tantalum is 
extracted by companies in various countries. Tantalum is used in digital 
communication devices – such as laptops, tablets and particularly 3G and 4G 
phones – because its robustness across a range of temperatures and ability to 
store and release electric charge are properties that are required for the 
production of capacitors in the microchips of such devices (Whitman, 2012; Nest, 
2011). Currently, there is no like-for-like industrial substitute for it, which is why 
it has euphemistically been called a ‘strategic mineral’ by the US Department of 
Defence. The less exotic, but equally necessary, element of tin is essential in the 
production of these same devices. It is not only used for casing but makes up a 
large proportion of the solder that holds together resistors, transistors and 
circuit boards. Nearly half of all mined tin is used for such purposes and 
Indonesia is currently the world’s biggest exporter of tin (Friends of the Earth, 
2012). The scramble to control and exploit these natural resources to 
manufacture digital technologies constitutes a very old and familiar materialist 
struggle played out for the benefit of supposedly new digital citizens. 
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Control over the lucrative coltan is a prime objective of armed groups in the DRC, 
who are estimated to earn $8 million per year from its trade (Whitman 2012, p.  
135). Increases in consumer demand for this resource, associated with the 
release of various consumer products such as laptops and games consoles, has 
therefore been indirectly linked to civil war, mass atrocities and associated 
sexual violence in the Eastern region of the DRC (MacIver, 2012; Whitman, 
2012). Due to the complexity of supply chains, Whitman (2012) suggests that by 
the time coltan reaches refining companies in Europe and Asia, it is virtually 
impossible to distinguish ‘clean’ from ‘dirty’ tantalum. Despite these atrocities, 
its trade continues unabated due to growth markets in China, India and Russia, 
and ‘because of the direction in which manufactured goods tend to flow, much of 
this coltan is likely still finding its way into goods destined for consumers in the 
global North’ (MacIver, 2012, p. 167). Thus rather than something new, digital 
citizenship is constituted (although this is obscured in the hegemonic discourses 
about digital citizenship) by the familiar practices of environmental despoliation, 
civil war, slave labour and sexual violence for resource extraction and 
exploitation. 
 
The labour relations of both resource extraction and product assembly further 
reveal the materiality of the digital. Indonesian tin mostly comes from Bangka 
Island. Its mining is an essential source of income for local people and a miner 
can make almost three times an agricultural day labourer’s rate at the equivalent 
of £12 per day (Friends of the Earth, 2012, p. 19). Despite this, working 
conditions are documented as being extremely treacherous with injuries and 
fatal accidents common. Moreover, pollution of drinking water, loss of soil 
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fertility, decreasing fish stocks and loss of 60-70% of local coral from tin 
dredging are consequences of mining practices (ibid., p.13). Supply chain 
research conducted by Friends of the Earth (ibid.) has revealed that Samsung 
and Foxconn (the company that assembles Apple products) rely on tin from 
Bangka. A radical digital citizenship, we argue, must reckon with these brutal 
material struggles that form the foundation of supposedly ‘new’ digital relations.  
Radical digital citizens seeking to challenge inequality must act to make these 
seemingly invisible racist, patriarchal, enslaving and capitalist power relations 
visible.  
 
From raw materials, we turn to their transformation into consumer products and 
technologies through the assembly process. We focus on Foxconn (or Hon Hai 
Precision) – Apple’s contract manufacturers in China. The labour power required 
to produce Apple products is secured through a Chinese economic policy which: 
(1) has attracted capital through tax exemptions, with the effect of underfunding 
public services such as social welfare, healthcare and education (2) has 
stagnated wages for agricultural workers in order to ensure an almost limitless 
supply of urban labour for high-tech industry (Sandoval, 2013). Significantly, 
robotic assembly technologies are under-utilised in comparison to European and 
North American high-tech industries because Chinese wage labour is so cheap 
(Sandoval 2013, p. 327). The new Chinese urban workers—rural migrants, 
oftentimes young women—are routinely denied education, health and 
employment rights due to a legal framework that denies them urban citizenship 
status (Nakamura, 2011; Sandoval, 2013). In this context, gender, ethnic and 
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class relations in digital labour have very real impacts on citizenship status and 
rights.  
 
Thus, through the lived but obscured experiences of rural and urban workers in 
the Global South we can see the material relations of production upon which the 
digital is premised. And yet, although marginal, there are instances of activist-
academic alliances practicing forms of radical digital citizenship that re-define 
digital citizenship as a relational, politically engaged and oppositional process. 
Following multiple suicides by Foxconn employees in 2010, a group of students 
and scholars organised with labour activists, media campaigners, NGOs, current 
and ex-Foxconn employees to undertake a participatory action research project 
and to provide support and advice for factory workers (Qui, Gregg and Crawford, 
2014). Consequently, ex-Foxconn employees, students and academics have been 
involved in collectively producing educational resources and materials shared 
online, such as the documentary ‘Deconstructing Foxconn’ in order to raise 
consciousness and mobilise around these issues (ibid, p. 574). Moreover, 
Foxconn employees, through their labour organising, are increasingly using their 
mobile phones in acts of citizen journalism, to document the poor conditions and 
the industrial relations of their workplaces (Chan and Pun, 2010; Qui et al. 
2014).  
 
Thus we see the potential for radical, creative and oppositional mobilisations 
which support the political agency of exploited workers and force us to consider 
more critical and capacious ideas of both digital education and digital citizenship. 
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Exploitative relations are not confined to the Global South, however. We will now 
turn to examine digital technology’s material consequences in the Global North. 
 
Digital technology’s logic of displacement and dislocation 
In the Global North and in the United State in particular, we also see the 
materialities of the digital at work. Emblematic of this process is the systematic 
displacement of long established middle and working class African American and 
Latinx communities from their neighbourhoods in the Bay Area in California and 
in Brooklyn in New York City, two hubs of technocapitalism. The billions of 
dollars made by tech entrepreneurs and venture capitalists have profound 
localised consequences that are disproportionately borne by racialised groups in 
these two areas. For instance, the rise in the median rental price in Oakland has 
seen a 25% drop in the Black population since 2000 (Cagle, 2014). Google, 
Facebook and Apple, which are engaged in widespread tax avoidance, use 
publically funded roads, bus stops and bus lanes to operate a private fleet of 
buses, so-called ‘Google buses’, for their employees who commute between their 
homes in Oakland and San Francisco and their corporate offices in Silicon Valley 
(Rodriguez, 21/9/15). With skyrocketing costs of living combined with the 
privatisation of key public services and a lack of rent controls, tech-based 
gentrification is rapidly transforming the race and class of once affordable and 
liveable inner-city neighbourhoods (Judd and Douglas, 2014).  
 
We recognize that the politics of gentrification is a complex phenomenon not 
solely attributable to the digital technology industry. However, the municipal 
government in the Bay Area has leveraged the digital technology boom to attract 
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the industry and its employees to Oakland and San Francisco, which, we argue, is 
a de facto gentrification policy for poor and working class neighbourhoods.  
Indeed, San Francisco’s Municipal Transportation Agency (MTA) Board of 
Directors has normalized and sought to regulate the use of so-called ‘Google 
buses’ making them a permanent feature of the city’s transport system—with 
MTA only charging $3.67 for each ‘shuttle stop event’ from the participating 
billon dollar tech companies (Rodriguez 17/11/15). This purposeful 
undercharging of these corporations appears to us to be a tax subsidy that 
supports the displacement of poor and working class Black and Latinx residents. 
Furthermore, Whittle et al (2015, p.160) demonstrate how tech-based 
gentrification exacerbates existing public health problems such as food 
insecurity and chronic illness by inflating housing costs which forces chronically 
ill individuals to choose between food and rent. The researchers argue that 
increasing housing insecurity can only be understood in the context of the 
‘structural violence’ of neoliberal urban policy that has created the conditions for 
the influx of high-tech capital, whilst failing to put in place rent control policies to 
stabilise neighbourhoods and secure the tenancies of long established working 
class Black and Latinx communities.  
 
Neither can the energy requirements and environmental implications of techno-
capitalism in the Global North be disentangled from the structural violence of 
neoliberal urban development. For example, the reality behind the benign 
language of ‘cloud computing’ comprises ‘massive structures housing thousands 
of servers for storing data, advanced mechanical cooling and ventilation 
equipment’, which in some cases require more power than medium-sized towns 
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(Mahmoudi and Levenda, 2016, p. 108). Significantly, the resource intense 
(water, bricks and mortar, fossil fuels, telecommunication infrastructure etc.) 
materiality of such data centres has driven extensive corporate-state collusion in 
the form of firms successfully lobbying for corporate tax exemptions so that they 
can afford to do business at the expense of the most marginalised. This is why  
 
we argue that a radical digital citizenship must be predicated on relational 
understandings of materialities: understandings which work relentlessly to 
expose the raced, gendered and classed  bodies masked by the digital fetish.  
 
Given these ‘old’ materialist politics of expropriation and exploitation embedded 
in the digital in both the Global South and North, what is, in fact, ‘new’ in terms of 
digital citizenship and technology? We will now turn to explore new ways of 
organising in social movements that digital technology affords. 
 
New opportunities for social protest? 
Certainly, what is new is that these materially mediated digital technologies offer 
a different way to communicate across time and space that circumvent mass 
media outlets. For our purposes here, we are particularly interested in the 
significance of this for citizenship practices. Social movement theorist Manuel 
Castells (2012) claims that we have witnessed a global epochal shift to a 
‘network society’, implying that hegemonic power lies with those who control, 
program and connect dominant networks. For him, it follows that citizen 
counter-power is contingent on the ability of social movements to ‘reprogram’ 
networks around alternative interests and values and build connections between 
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‘pro-democracy networks and economic justice networks, women’s rights 
networks, environmental conservation networks, peace networks, freedom 
networks and so on’ (Castells, 2012, p. 17).  
 
Furthermore, Castells argues that a feature of the ‘new’ is contemporary social 
movements’ existence in hybrid space-times between the urban ‘space of place’ 
(occupations, encampments, street protests and other forms of direct action) and 
the digital ‘space of flows’. This allows discrete citizen mobilisations to network 
and learn from one another at a heretofore unachievable rate. Collin and Apple 
(2010, p. 48) make a similar case that: 
 
The wiring together of the world and the spread of digital literacies 
means that increasing numbers of workers and activists are able to 
communicate rapidly and at little cost both within and across groups. 
Thus, feminists struggling against healthcare policies that exploit 
women’s unpaid labour may work online to alert and enlist the help of 
environmentalists committed to creating healthier living conditions for 
all families. 
 
On the face if it, this analysis seems to hold across a range of contemporary social 
movements, from Occupy to the Arab Spring to Black Lives Matter.  Let us take 
Black Lives Matter as an example. Black Lives Matter1 is the movement against 
the extra-judicial killings of Black people in America and has grown to have a 
                                                        
1 Note that activists make a distinction between #BlackLivesMatter, the twitter hashtag, Black Lives Matter, 
the national activist network set up by Garza, Tometi and Cullors and the Movement for Black Lives, the 
broader social movement struggling for justice and equality for Black people. For our purposes here, we are 
discussing all three manifestations of this movement. 
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much wider focus on the equality and social justice for Black people. The Twitter 
hashtag #Blacklivesmatter was established in 2013 by three Black Queer 
women—Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi and Patrisse Cullors—to give space to the 
collective anger at the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the murder of Trayvon 
Martin (Garza 2014; Ruffin 2015). Social media was used for storytelling, 
mobilization and citizen journalism and the movement grew significantly in 
2014 following the organization of a ‘freedom ride’ to Ferguson, Missouri to 
build solidarity with Black activists protesting the fatal shooting of Michael 
Brown by Darren Wilson. As DeRay McKesson (Kang 9/8/15), a prominent 
protestor in the Movement for Black Lives and a prolific #BlackLivesMatter 
Twitter user argues: 
 
Social media was our weapon against erasure. It is how many of us first 
became aware of the protests and how we learned where to go, or what 
to do when teargassed, or who to trust…Many of us became friends 
digitally, first. And then we, the protestors, met in person. Social media 
allowed us to become our own storytellers. With it, we seized the power 
of our truth. 
 
However, whilst the scale and complexity of the movement’s social relations 
(and thus learning capacity) would clearly not be possible without these new 
digital technologies, we should perhaps resist Castells’ (2012) romanticized idea 
of a leaderless movement through which participants relate on equal footing in 
frictionless, horizontal spaces. Indeed, as Alicia Garza (2014) argues in her 
herstory of the movement, Black Lives Matter was developed in response to the 
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systematic exclusions of different kinds of Black people in ostensibly 
emancipatory Black liberation spaces:  ‘Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of 
Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, Black undocumented folks, folks with 
records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those 
that have been marginalized within Black liberation movements’. Thus the ‘old’ 
power relations within the supposedly ‘new’ terrain of digital activism help to 
shape articulations and actions that challenge romanticized ideals of open, 
democratic and non-hierarchical relations within a ‘network society’.   
 
Note, we are not claiming that the ‘newness’ of digital citizenship is actually ‘old’ 
in the sense that it is the same ‘kind of thing’ as longstanding activist practices, 
merely amplified by technology. Nor would we deny that digital technologies 
have unintended and emergent effects on social action.  Instead, through a 
consideration of the extent to which the ‘old’ materiality of the digital has been 
obfuscated, we argue that a radical digital citizenship should partly be about the 
capacity to deconstruct seductive grand narratives that erase or deprioritise the 
situated and complex politics of redistribution and recognition in particular 
struggles. We must pay close attention to the relationship between 
misrecognition and material inequality when we speak of the ‘new’ affordances 
of digital technologies in citizenship practices.  
 
In short, radical digital citizenship must address the material and discursive 
aspects of digital subjectification. It is to such matters we now turn.  
 
Digital Subjectification 
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Given the obfuscation of the materialities of the digital, we are interested in the 
consequences of digital education’s hegemonic constructions of digital 
citizenship and technology. Digital education oftentimes reproduces neoliberal 
citizen subjectivities that are functionally aligned with the requirements of 
digital capitalism. There is a sense in which the ‘cyber culture’ ideal of the digital 
citizen epitomises what Boltanksi and Chiapello (2006) identify as the ‘New 
Spirit of Capitalism.’ Du Gay and Morgan (2013, p. 24) explain further: 
 
This ‘ideal typical’ figure is a nomadic ‘network-extender’, mobile, 
tolerant of difference and ambivalence, realistic about people’s desires 
(and weaknesses), informal and friendly, with a less rigid relationship to 
property. Those lacking the requisite flexibility, who cannot become the 
nodal point of various networks, thus generating the necessary activity, 
or otherwise engage, communicate, market, innovate, add value, and so 
on and so forth, have little hope of success.  
 
In other words, digital citizens exist outside of time and place. This extreme 
cosmopolitanism requires no anchoring and loyalty to a particular job, 
neighbourhood or even nation state. Those who must be tied to a time and place, 
because of poverty or caring responsibilities, will be left behind in this brave new 
world. However, the infinite flexibility of the nomadic digital citizen comes at a 
very high price. The nomadic digital citizen is also a precarious one with few 
expectations of job security or state-based social welfare (Standing 2013).  
This freedom through precarity presents both affective and cognitive challenges. 
Cockayne (forthcoming 2016, p. 15), who explores the affective dimensions of 
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creative digital labour, argues that techno-utopian narratives of ‘horizontality, 
empowerment and democratisation’ are coupled to ‘the forms of work they 
valorise, which necessarily include normative entrepreneurial and affective 
attachments to precarious working conditions.’  
Moreover, digital education has tended to advance an exclusionary ideal of 
digital citizenship. Turner (2008), in his historical account of the rise of ‘digital 
utopianism’, shows how the protagonists at the convergence of counter culture 
and tech entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley universalised their own standpoints 
to construct an ideal type of the new digital citizen: a white, educated, middle 
class man living in the Global North. This nomadic digital citizen, as we argued 
above, has the ability to be infinitely flexible and untied to a particular time and 
place is a privileged position dependent on one’s race, class, gender and legal 
status. Importantly, these digital citizens practice a kind of utopian politics that 
seeks to accelerate the gains of digital technology beyond the ‘value system, 
governance structures and mass pathologies’ of ‘late capitalism’ in a process of 
globalisation ‘from below’ (Williams and Srnicek, 2013, no pagination). By 
attempting to ‘democratise knowledge’ about coding, financial algorithms and 
Big Data for the benefit of those groups who are failing to be flexible in a 
disrupted world, these nomadic digital citizens seek to intervene and repurpose 
technocapitalism for progressive ends. We can see examples of these practices in 
the myriad of projects that seek to include ‘under-represented’ groups in 
techocapitalism through training and development programmes  
(for example see: Hack the Hood http://www.hackthehood.org, Women Who 
Code https://www.womenwhocode.com and We Code America 
http://www.wecodeamerica.com). 
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Whilst these kinds of ‘civic tech’ initiatives are important in the democratisation 
of digital technology knowledge, they seek to include the so-called ‘digital have 
nots’ in the prevailing logic of exclusion and capitalist consumption. The human 
geography of Silicon Valley itself reflects this. For example, Davidson’s (2015, p. 
399-400) ethnographic study of the ‘spatialised politics’ of aspiration in two 
different high schools in Silicon Valley (one predominantly white and one 
predominantly Latinx) found that:  
Despite the efforts of many well-meaning educators and workers in 
Silicon Valley working within programmes…designed to ‘bridge the 
digital divide’, gendered, hetero-patriarchal, and racialized school space, 
urban space, and (anti-immigrant) national space worked to promote the 
social exclusion of Latina students by constructing them as not 
academically inclined, too interested in boys and sex, likely to get 
pregnant (hyper-reproductive), and unemployable as a highly-skilled 
worker.  
 
Democratising digital technology knowledge is crucial but the bases on which 
different social groups are included in this digital utopia are elided. Too often 
utopian practices ‘[intensify] a largely online and networked politics’ that relies 
heavily on individualised notions of self-improvement, self-organisation and 
advancement—through the acquisition of digital knowledge, skills and 
capabilities—which ‘pretends not only that there are no gendered, class or raced 
hierarchies between the actors, but also suggests a subject capable of organising’ 
(Hoofd, 2010, p. 15). Under technocapitalism, nomadic digital citizens are 
compelled ‘to situate themselves [in the social world] by pretending everyone is 
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on the same level of privilege’ and that there are no institutionalised inequalities 
that might undermine the agency of citizens (ibid., p. 17).  
 
Given the limitations of these prevailing constructions of digital citizenship in 
digital education, we will now turn to examine what an alternative model to 
dominant approaches to digital citizenship might look like. We seek to define 
radical digital citizenship and attempt to discuss in greater detail the constitutive 
elements of this form of citizenship and the implications this has for technology 
and radical citizenship practices.  
 
Towards a radical digital citizenship 
We define ‘radical digital citizenship’ as a process by which individuals and 
groups committed to social justice critically analyse the social, political and 
economic consequences of digital technologies in everyday life and collectively 
deliberate and take action to build alternative and emancipatory technologies 
and technological practices. Unlike hegemonic models of digital citizenship in 
digital education, radical digital citizenship is not concerned with the 
instrumental process of acquiring digital literacy and capabilities in order to 
effectively function in an apparently ‘disrupted’ world. Instead, the cornerstone 
of a radical digital citizenship is the insistence that citizenship is a process of 
becoming—that it is an active and reflective state for individual and collective 
thinking and practice for collective action for the common good (hooks, 2003; 
Lister, 2003; Yuval-Davis, 2013). Radical digital citizenship is a fundamentally 
political practice of understanding the implications of the development and 
application of technology in our lives. We believe that scholars, activists, 
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practitioners and artists can and should adopt the practices of radical digital 
citizenship. We will now turn to discuss what we see as the two constitutive 
elements of a radical digital citizenship: 1) critically analysing technology and 2) 
collective action for developing emancipatory technologies.  
 
To make meaningful the idea of a radical digital citizenship means citizens must 
attempt to understand the social construction of technology and evaluate the 
political features of technology (Heidegger, 1977; Mumford, 1964; Winner, 1980; 
Pinch and Bijker, 1987; Klein and Kleinman, 2002; Chun and Coleman 2009; 
Noble 2013; Noble and Tynes forthcoming 2016; Nakamura 2015). In so doing, 
citizens will be able to trace the particular political, economic and social 
arrangements that give rise to certain kinds of technology and examine the 
influence of technology on social relations. For example, Winner (1980) 
persuasively demonstrates how Robert Moses, the powerful urban planner in 
New York City during the 1960s and 1970s, turned the city’s infrastructure into a 
technology designed to frustrate desegregation efforts and undermine the social 
citizenship claims of African Americans and Latinxs. In particular, Winner (1980, 
pp. 3-4) shows how Moses constructed freeways and bridges in such a way as to 
block public transport from reaching all-white suburbs. Since minority groups at 
the time were most likely to use public transport for work and leisure, Moses 
effectively prevented these groups from settling in white neighbourhoods by 
privileging the car as the only means of transport from the city to the suburbs. By 
refusing to define technology as a neutral concept, we can see how it—in this 
case, the transportation infrastructure in New York city and its suburbs—can 
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embody particular ideologies to undermine the citizenship claims of 
marginalised groups.  
 
In groundbreaking work, Safiya Umoja Noble (2013; forthcoming 2016) 
demonstrates how racism and sexism are encoded in the seemingly apolitical 
space of Google’s algorithm. Noble argues that women of colour experience a loss 
of agency through the racist and sexist misrecognitions and misrepresentations 
that are generated through various search engines. The dominance of white male 
engineers at Google who are not attuned to these politics in the coding process 
and the naturalisation of racism and sexism in our culture combine to re-enforce 
racist and sexist oppression on the web.  
 
Politicising technology makes it easier to understand how:  
there is no such thing as a pure and politically innocent “basic” science 
that can be transformed into technological applications to be “applied” in 
“good” or “bad” ways at a comfortable distance from the “clean” hands of 
the researcher engaged in the former. (Asberg and Lykke, 2010, p. 299) 
 
To practice a radical digital citizenship is to resist the idea that a neutral 
technology exists. Technology always reflects the interests of scientists, 
engineers and capitalists (and in Silicon Valley, as elsewhere, there is little 
difference between engineers and capitalists) thus ‘the practices and social 
relations of technoscience go hand in hand with global and local capitalism’ 
(Asberg and Lykke, 2010, p. 300). By critically analysing the social construction 
of technology, we can map the effects of particular kinds of technology beyond 
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its ‘intended’ applications. Returning to the example of Oakland, by politicizing 
digital technology, we are able to understand that the displacement of African 
American and Latinx residents from their neighbourhoods through rapid 
gentrification is not an ‘unintentional’, ‘unforeseen’ and ultimately ‘unfortunate’ 
byproduct of the tech boom in nearby Silicon Valley. Rather, to understand the 
digital technologies designed and engineered (but not manufactured) in Silicon 
Valley necessitates that we understand their local and global effects. Just as 
Robert Moses used urban transport infrastructure to further his racist politics, so 
the tech entrepreneurs and companies are using digital technologies to 
transform Oakland in their own image. This city is being reconstructed to better 
facilitate capitalist reproduction and better service (at the direct expense of 
working class minority residents) the rich, white and mostly male nomadic 
digital citizens untied and disloyal to a particular time and place. Thus, to 
understand what digital technology is, we must understand what it does, 
materially and asymmetrically, to different social groups. 
 
Politicising technology is directly linked to what we identify as the second 
constitutive element of a radical digital citizenship and that is collective action 
for emancipatory technology and technological practice. By ‘collective action for 
emancipatory technology and technological practice’ we mean the process by 
which individuals and groups work together to build and maintain alternative 
communication infrastructure to enable marginalised groups to ‘convey their 
own messages, bypassing the filters of commercial and state gatekeepers’ (Milan 
2013, p. 1). A tentative example of this kind of work might be observed in the 
Femtech network (http://femtechnet.org). If we recognise that dominant digital 
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and communication technologies embody and practice an exclusionary capitalist 
ethos, then it is important to develop independent information platforms, 
alternative presses, grassroots internet service providers (ISPs), and open 
source software that support dialogue, organisation and mobilisation outside the 
confines of corporate media infrastructure (Earl and Kimport, 2011). However, it 
is important to resist techno-utopian thinking about emancipatory technology 
and technological spaces. Whilst important examples of emancipatory 
technology include Linux and Ubuntu, the free open source software and 
operating systems, open source movements are themselves oftentimes 
exclusionary spaces in which radical activists—in the name of liberation—
reproduce racism, sexism and homophobia (Nakamura, Kolko and Rodman, 
2000; Tanczer, 2015). Thus, emancipatory technological practices must look 
beyond simplistic analyses of class and capitalism and take seriously 
intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality and disability (Juhasz and 
Balasmo,2012; Cooper and Rhee,2015).  
 
An important example of creating alternative technological spaces for 
emancipatory learning and practice is the 2015 Women’s Freedom Conference, a 
digital conference organised by women of colour to ‘center and amplify the 
unique voices and experiences of underrepresented women who have been 
disenfranchised beyond gender alone’ 
(http://womensfreedomconference.com/live/). A collective leadership of Black 
women, including Feminista Jones, Sarah Huny Young and Melanie Dione, coded 
and built their site, organised and hosted the live-stream of 41 speakers and 
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coordinated participant debate across a range of social media platforms in order 
to include the largest possible number of women of colour across the globe. 
 
However, we also identify emancipatory technological practices using corporate 
digital social media platforms. Returning to our earlier example of Black Lives 
Matter, activists have been able to transform aspects of Twitter into 
emancipatory learning and protest spaces. The act of using a hashtag to denote 
the murder of a Black person by the police has become a routinised political and 
pedagogical practice in which a hashtag becomes a space for citizen journalists 
to share information about the incident, and to organize and mobilise in both 
digital and neighbourhood spaces for justice. Indeed the hashtag has become a 
key site for political education for Black Lives Matter activists that has sparked a 
number of other related campaigns such as #SayHerName, which seeks to 
counter the prevailing notion that Black death at the hands of the police is solely 
a problem for Black men and highlight state sanctioned brutalisations and deaths 
of Black women and Black trans women. Again, what is important to emphasise 
is that Twitter does not determine activism—but, it is not neutral either, it 
supports new forms of learning about injustices which in turn enhance 
grassroots organising efforts by activists for social justice. 
 
If politics is about struggles for power, then part of the struggle is to name digital 
technologies as a power relation and create alternative technology and practices 
to create new spaces for citizens to encounter each other to struggle for equality 
and justice. This, of course, does not mean that emancipatory uses of technology 
are free from the materialist inequalities and injustices we outlined earlier in 
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this article. What is missing in the radical digital citizenship examples of we cite 
is an explicit acknowledgement of and activism against technology’s exploitative 
production and critical reflections on the implications the production of 
technology has on how activists construct their emancipatory praxes.  
 
So, what does radical digital citizenship mean for digital education? For us, 
digital education must move away from its apolitical and/or politically naïve 
posture. If the field of digital education wants to be more than just a convenient 
tool for the neoliberal reshaping of education and citizenship, it must take 
seriously the radical potential of education in digital spaces and digital 
technologies. What that means is that digital education, as an academic field of 
practice, is not just about investigating the educational experiences of being 
online. Understanding this new space for human activity and education is 
important but it is also important to identify the ways in which it has been 
created and shaped for particular purposes. To pretend that those purposes do 
not matter—or worse, pretend that those purposes are part of a different 
conversation that is outside the purview of digital education is a mistake. The 
critical heavy lifting about digital technologies should not be left to cultural 
theory and science and technology studies scholars and digital privacy and rights 
activists. We think the apolitical stance of digital education amounts to an 
abdication of responsibility about what education in digital spaces might mean 
and what education in these spaces might be.   
 
As Lyn Tett (2010) argues, education is at least partly about desire fulfillment. 
Taking part in education is an opportunity to consider the world as it is and how 
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it could be. Education can ‘open up a way to aspiration, to desire better, to desire 
more and to above all to desire in a different way’ (Thompson 1976, quoted in 
Tett, 2010, p. 97). Digital education can play an important role in helping 
individuals and groups desire more for themselves than being a commodity and 
performing a digital self online. We think digital education can help us to desire 
more from the internet than just the commodification of digital spaces. We also 
think that digital education can help us understand systemic social, economic 
and environmental inequalities in a new and different way. However, to make 
this leap to help us desire better requires the development of a radical digital 
citizenship.  
 
Conclusions 
In this article we attempted to examine how certain facets of digital education, as 
a scholarly field, construct digital citizenship in ways that obscure the politics of 
the digital and reproduce exclusionary and capitalist forms of citizenship. We 
argued that digital citizenship is depoliticised through a hegemonic assumption 
that the digital is fundamentally new and immaterial. We went on to 
demonstrate how, in fact, the digital and digital technologies are constituted by 
on-going materialist struggles for equality and justice. As a way to re-politicise 
digital citizenship, we argued for an alternative radical digital citizenship in 
which critical social relations with technology are made visible and that 
emancipatory technological practices for social justice are developed.  
 
We are sceptical about the possibilities of developing a radical digital citizenship 
in digital education. The key priorities in digital education at present such as 
 28 
developing online undergraduate, postgraduate programmes and massive online 
open courses (MOOCs), learning analytics and analysing digital identities in 
online spaces, constrain critical questions about the politics of digital education. 
This is especially case in relation to the very real material struggles—between 
faculty, students, universities and private sector organisations—over the shape, 
delivery, cost and accessibility of higher education. The above academic 
questions about digital education are important but they must always and 
relentlessly be put in a wider context of the struggles of power as embodied in 
digital technologies. 
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